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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: PROTECTING THE





During the late 1960's and early 1970's interest in attending law school
boomed and the legal education industry experienced substantial eco-
nomic growth.1 Law schools responded to that growth by improving or
increasing the size of their faculties and facilities. Minorities, however,
comprised few of the new inductees into the legal teaching profession of
the period.2 Consequently, the vast majority of minority law professors
have been teaching for a relatively short period of time. Now, as law
school enrollments decline and the economic roller-coaster of the 80's
approaches a low point, there is growing concern that untenured minor-
ity professors,3 following the traditional last-in first-out employment ter-
mination practice, will be the primary victims of tightening law school
budgets.
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the economic, social, or
historical complexities of the process which keeps women and Blacks
from attaining appointments to law faculties in proportion to their num-
bers and qualifications. Rather this article suggests that on the eve of a
period of substantial decline in law school enrollment, law schools should
be able to assure law students, minority professors and society in general
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, North Carolina Central School of Law. B.A., 1982
University of Mississippi; J.D., 1984 University of Mississippi School of Law; LL.M., 1987, Colum-
bia University School of Law.
** B.S., 1981, University of Mississippi; M.Ed., 1983 University of Mississippi.
1. Between 1968-69 and 1970-71 the number of persons taking the LSAT doubled from 60,000
to 120,000. R. STEVEN S, Legal Education In America From The 1850's To The 1980's, 235 (1983).
2. The law teaching profession is still more than 92% white. PRAGUE, Minority Law Teach-
ers, 1986 AALS Newsletter 86-4.
3. The majority of approved schools have a tenure level of about 50% and a fourth are at
about 75%. The median percentage of tenured faculty increased 2.2% between the 1979-80 and
1980-81 academic years. Memorandum QS8081 (March 23, 1981) from the Consultant on Legal
Education to the deans of approved schools.
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that the few gains minorities have made over the past years will not be
discarded during the current financial exigency.
This article will discuss affirmative action programs as a means of alle-
viating the potential demise of (untenured) minority professors. Section
I will discuss the historical development and meaning of affirmative ac-
tion. This section also scrutinizes the present affirmative action policy
of the American Bar Association (ABA) and its potential ability to for-
mulate plans for ensuring employment for untenured minority professors
during periods of financial exigency. Section II will examine the case law
in the area of preferential layoff plans. This section sets forth a means of
formulating defensible affirmative action plans in a time of increasing
suits opposing affirmative action. Section III concludes that affirmative
action programs should include special provisions for the employment of
untenured minority professors during financial exigency, also, the Ameri-
can Bar Association as chief accreditation organization for law schools
must take a more definite stance in this area.
ACADEMIC FREEDOM, TENURE AND THE THEORY OF
RETRENCHMENT
The concept of academic freedom implies that teaching and research
shall be free from political and governmental regulation. Though no pre-
cise definition of academic freedom has been articulated,4 the ABA re-
quires that law schools have an established and announced policy of
academic freedom and tenure.' The ABA has adopted the 1940 State-
ment of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure promulgated by
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the As-
sociation of American Colleges, as illustrative of academic freedom and
tenure policies for law schools.6 Therein tenure is set out as:
4. One definition given by Arthur 0. Lovejoy, the founder of the American Assn. of Univer-
sity Professors is:
Academic freedom is the freedom of a teacher or researcher in higher institutions of learning to
investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to express his conclusions, whether
through publication or the instruction of students, without interference from political or ecclesi-
astical authority, or from the administrative officials of the institution in which he is employed,
unless his methods are found by qualified bodies of his own profession to be clearly incompetent
or contrary to professional ethics.
W. HEREBERG, C.H. PRITCHETT, D. FELLMAN, V. EARLE, S. HOOK, ON ACADEMIC FREE-
DOM, 1 (1972). Compare AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM, ACADEMIC
RESPONSIBILITY, ACADEMIC DUE PROCESS IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING, 7 (Rev. Ed.
1966).
5. A.B.A., 1983 Approval of Law Schools, Standard 405, 12. "A law school which appears to
have no comprehensive system of evaluation for and granting tenure is not in compliance with Stan-
dard 405." Interpretation 7 of Standard 405.
6. Id. at 22. The weight accorded to AAUP standards and policy is uncertain, however,
where institutional regulations explicitly refer to the 1940 Statement, courts have undertaken to
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a means to certain ends; specifically:
(1) freedom of teaching and research and of extramural activities, and
(2) a sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession attrac-
tive to men and women of ability. Freedom and economic security,
hence, tenure, are indispensable to the success of an institution in fulfil-
ling its obligations to its students and to society.7
Typically, once a law professor has completed a probationary period,
usually not to exceed seven years, tenure secures for him a limited right
of continued employment.8 Tenured faculty members, however, may be
dismissed for cause.9 There is no uniform definition of what constitutes
adequate cause.10 Immorality," incompetence12 and neglect of duty 3
have all been found to be sufficient cause for dismissal of tenured profes-
sors. Bona fide financial exigency is also recognized as a basis for dismis-
sal of tenured professors. 4 Exactly what constitutes financial exigency is
consider its history and later bilateral interpretations and unilateral AAUP refinements as a guide to
what the Statement means in a particular situation. For example, a federal appellate court reversed
a lower court's decision holding that a university's regulation, under which a tenured faculty mem-
ber was dismissed for "adequate cause," was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The appellate
court took notice that the university regulation "was adopted almost verbatim from the 1940 State-
ment of Principles of the AAUP" and construed an advisory letter by the Association interpreting
the 1940 statement as eliminating any overbreadth resulting in facial invalidity of the university
regulation, Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929, 934-35 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Browzin v. Catholic
University of America, 375 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
7. A.B.A., 1983 Approval of Law Schools at 22.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Recommended Institutional Regulations on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 58 AAUP
BULL. 430, RIR 5 (1972).
11. Koch v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 39 Ill. App. 2d 51, 187 N.E.2d 340, (1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 989 (1964).
12. Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d 382 (3rd Cir. 1975).
13. Shaw v. Bd. of Trustees of Frederick Community College, 549 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1976).
14. A.B.A., 1983 Approval of Law Schools, 24. In the majority of cases courts have interpreted
contracts which contained an explicit reference to financial exigency. See, eg., Browzin v. Catholic
Univ., 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Bellak v. Francona College, 386 A.2d 1266 (N.H. 1978); Am.
Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249, 322 A.2d 846 (ch. div. 1974),
aff'd, 136 N.J. Super. 442, 346 A.2d 615 (app. div. 1975); Schever v. Creighton University, 199 Neb.
618, 260 N.W.2d 595 (1977). In other cases where the contracts did not mention the term, the courts
construed tenure as implicitly granting institutions the right to make bona fide dismissals for finan-
cial reasons. See Johnson v. Board of Regents, 337 F. Supp. 227, 234-35 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd,
510 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975); Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945 (D. Neb. 1974). Cf.
Rehor v. Case Western Reserve Univ., 43 Ohio St. 2d 224, 331 N.E. 2d 416 (1975). No case indi-
cates that the grant of tenure creates a right from dismissal for bona fide financial reasons.
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not clear, nevertheless, large deficits, 15 and declining enrollments accom-
panied by legislative budget cuts1 6 have been held to establish bona fide
financial distress adequate to justify termination of a tenured professor's
employment contract.
The theory of academic freedom and tenure has also been interpreted
to require financially strained institutions to place tenured professors in
other suitable positions before terminating their contracts. 17 The depart-
ment in which the professor formerly worked is normally the most likely
place where a suitable position should be found. However, the university
has not discharged its obligation to the tenured professor until it has con-
sidered placement in another department or school.1 8 This, in essence, is
the theory of retrenchment.
The theory of retrenchment prohibits financial exigency from becom-
mng an excuse for dismissing a tenured professor who is merely unpopu-
lar, controversial or misunderstood. The retrenchment requirement
stands as a partial check against such abuses.1 9 The AAUP's Statement
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure as adopted by the ABA
has also been interpreted to suggest that financially distressed institutions
should terminate non-tenured professors before dismissing tenured
professors.2°
I. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A. Failure of Present Law School Affirmative Action Programs
The broader social contract within which affirmative action operates
calls for assurance that the ranks of the minority law professors, espe-
cially Blacks and women, will be representative of the full heterogeneity
of class, ethnicity, race and gender of those who complete training as
lawyers. The legal profession, especially legal scholars, have not been
fulfilling that broader contract. Even in a decade characterized by a
highly vocal, if controversial, commitment to affirmative action, the
number of minority professors in legal education has changed little.21
15. Bellak v. Franconia College, 118 N.H. 313, 386 A.2d 1266 (1978).
16. Graney v. Bd. of Regents, 92 Wis. 2d 745, 286 N.W.2d 138 (1979); Levitt v. Board of
Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945 (D. Neb. 1974). See also Krotkoffv. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th
Cir. 1978).
17. Browzin v. Catholic University of America, 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
18. Id. n. 7 at 847.
19. Id.
20. On Institutional Problems Resulting From Financial Exigency: Some Operating Guidelines,
60 AAUP BULL. 4(c), 267 (1974).
21. BELL, Application of the "Tipping Point"Principle to Law Faculty Hiring Policies, 10 NOVA
L.J. 319 (1986). "The modest but measurable growth in the number of black and brown teachers on
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Affirmative action within legal education is in need of reform. At pres-
ent, all ABA approved law schools adhere to some type of affirmative
action program, yet approximately one-third of the ABA approved
schools still have no minority faculty members, and another one-third
have only one minority faculty member.22 The various affirmative action
programs usually reflect university policies and federal laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.
The major shortcoming of the majority of law school's affirmative ac-
tion programs is that the success of a particular program, in most re-
gards, depends totally on the particular law school's faculty conscience
and motivation.23 This is demonstrated by the fact that the majority of
law schools conscientiously attempt to hire only one black professor
(tokenism)24 and thereafter to carry out an affirmative action program by
allowing other Blacks to interview or otherwise participate in the appli-
cation process even though the minority applicant will not receive serious
consideration for employment.25 This system has failed to produce pro-
portionate numbers of minority law professors and it will inevitably fail
the faculties of white schools that climbed from almost none to 200 in the last 15 years is now in
decline." These sad statistics are contained in the Society of Law Teachers Statement on Minority
Hiring in AALS Law Schook- A Position Paper on the Need for Voluntary Quotas (1984) .... The
report finds that among 92 AALS schools responding to the survey there were 28 schools with no
minority faculty and 32 schools with only one. another 20 schools have two minority faculty mem-
bers. Excluding the four historically black schools, Howard, North Carolina Central, Southern and
Texas Southern, there are only 14 schools with more than two minorities .. " Id. at n.1.
22. PRAGER, Minority Law Teachers, 1986 AALS NEWSL. 4. Based on 1983-84 Task Force
data.
23. Most scholars agree that for the most part, the rationale behind the creation many affirma-
tive action programs has been more political or expedient that humanitarian. The policies and pro-
grams have been for the most part developed to avoid confrontation with federal agencies rather that
to correct past discrimination. See, eg. ROBERT P. HARO, AFEIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDU-
CATION, 3,4 (1977).
24. See PARKER, Ideas, Affirmative Action and the Idea 124.627, 10 NOVA L.J. 761 (1986).
25. The following excerpt outlines clear and concise guidelines for the development of an effec-
tive affirmative action program. Few, if any, law schools utilize such guidelines in developing their
affirmative action programs. The majority of court ordered affirmative action plans are developed
pursuant to guidelines as illustrated by this excerpt. See, e.g. United States v. Paradise, 55 U.S.L.W.
4211 (1987).
The first concern of any affirmative action program should be to develop a corresponding ratio
between population characteristics for the state or geographical region. Such considerations as
qualified and available talent, realistic time tables and projection should be coupled with the
ratio. Next, the institution and its key decision makers should be fully educated about the
purposes of affirmative action, the influence of both racism and discrimination within the em-
ployment and promotional processes, and the best methods possible to correct deficiencies or
underutilization of minorities and women. There should also be a person or group of people
accountable for the implementation of the policy. A base year should be developed from which
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to protect the few minority professors currently engaged in legal teaching
during difficult financial times.
B. Historical Development and Meanings
Today the phrase affirmative action seems ubiquitous. Rarely does af-
firmative action not receive attention in the daily press or news telecast.
It is an important part of most political campaigns and a common part of
the vocabulary of lawyers and laymen. Nevertheless, people generally
disregard the origins of affirmative action and they frequently differ over
what the term does or should mean.
A brief discussion of the historical development of the race-conscious
concept of affirmative action will be helpful to stress the importance of
affirmative action in legal education.
The race-conscious concept of affirmative action can be traced to the
enactment of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. z6
These amendments, including their enforcing Civil Rights Acts, were
adopted primarily for the benefit of Blacks.27 In the Slaughter House
Case,28 Justice Miller stated that the "one pervading purpose" of those
three amendments was to secure and establish the freedom of the slave
race and to protect the newly-made freeman and citizen from his former
oppressors.29 Justice Miller in Slaughter House also stated that other
citizens could share in the protection of the reconstruction amendments,
"[but] in any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these
amendments it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said
was the pervading spirit of them all." 0 Though the term affirmative ac-
tion was not then in use, the fundamental issues then and now are the
same: whether public programs should be designed to provide special
benefits or protection for persons on the basis of their membership in a
specified group.
The phrase "affirmative action" first appeared in a federal statute in
1935, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA).31 There the
National Labor Relations Board was empowered upon a finding of an
growth and improvement must be computed and compared against. This base year would also
serve as the basis for an index of performance in the attainment of affirmative action goals.
R.P. HARO, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION, 5,6 (1977).
26. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, XIV, XV.
27. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873). See also JoNES, The Genesis and
Present Status of Affirmative Action in Employment: Economic, Legal, and Political Realities, 70
IowA L. Rav. 901 (1985).
28. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1873).
29. Id. at 71.
30. Id. at 72.
31. Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. sections 157-169, (1982).
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unfair labor practice to issue cease and desist orders and to take such
affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without
back pay, as would effectuate its policies.32 The present meanings attrib-
uted to affirmative action came not from the NLRA of 1935, but from
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,33 almost thirty years later. The 1964 Act
marked the first appearance of the phrase in a federal statute dealing with
civil rights.
Since its appearance in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the phrase "af-
firmative action" has appeared widely in other civil rights statutes, regu-
lations, and court opinions; yet neither Congress nor courts have
attempted to define the term. Law professors, however, have not fol-
lowed this practice and have instead offered varying definitions of "af-
firmative action." Three such definitions follow:
(1) "The preferential treatment of individuals who are members of
previously discriminated against minorities;"3
4
(2) "The use of considerable resources of energy and funds to attract
individuals of particular minorities in order to cure or ameliorate past
injustice;"' 35 and
(3) "Public or private programs which provide or seek to provide
opportunities ...to persons or groups on the basis of, among other
things,' their membership in a specified group or groups. ,36
The definition attributed to affirmative action is very important. The
definition should express an affirmative duty. This duty is usually effec-
tuated in one of two ways. The first is the most affirmative; the particular
law faculty considers the applicant's minority status as an advantage in
the initial hiring stages and intentionally undertakes to hire a minority
person. This method is best expressed in definition (1) or a combination
of definitions (1) and (2) above. Under the second method minorities are
only allowed equality of opportunity in the employment process. The
applicant's race or ethnicity is usually not considered in the initial phase;
however, if the minority applicant remains among the finalists, his mi-
nority status is generally considered as an additional advantage. This
second method is practiced by the majority of law schools. Whether this
method should be considered affirmative action is questionable since the
32. Id. at section 160(c).
33. 42 U.S.C. § s 2000a - 2000e(17) (1982).
34. KARsT & HARowrrz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955 n.1,2
(1974).
35. BLOCK, New Wine in an Old Bottle: The Etymology of Affrmative Action, 66 AAUP 54, 55
(1980).
36. JoNEs, The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative Action in Employment: Economic,
Legal, and Political Realities, 70 IowA L. REv. 901, 903 (1985).
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applicant's qualifications, not color or sex, are the predominant factors in
his being offered the position.37
C. The ABA and Affirmative Action
Since 1921, the ABA has been engaged in setting procedures and mini-
mum standards to be met and observed by law schools in obtaining and
retaining the approval of the Association. The ABA accreditation of law
schools is a matter of critical importance" because graduation from an
ABA approved law school is generally necessary for admission to the bar
of most states.39 From its inception the ABA has been devoted to the
improvement of the legal profession through the improvement of the pre-
legal and legal education of those who apply for admission to the bar."
At present, the ABA provides approved schools with little guidance
for the development of affirmative action programs. The ABA's employ-
ment policy simply states:
The law school shall maintain equality of opportunity in legal education
without discrimination or segregation on the grounds of race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, or sex. The denial of employment to a qualified
individual will be treated as made upon the grounds of race, color, na-
tional origin or sex if the grounds for denial relied upon is an employ-
37. For a detailed analysis of problems confronted by Blacks and other minorities seeking law
teaching positions See, AALS section on minority groups, Report of Conference of Minority Admin-
istrators and Law Teachers (1976); BELL, Application of the "Tipping Point" Principle to Law
Faculty Hiring Policies, 10 NOVA L.J. 319 (1986); PARKER, Ideas, Affirmative Action and the Idea,
10 NOVA L.J. 761 (1986); and PRAGUE, Minority Law Teachers, 1986 AALS NEWSL. 4.
38. In 1921 the American Bar Association was recognized by the Department of Higher Edu-
cation as the official accreditation agency for American law schools. The primary purposes of the
American Bar Association as well as other accreditating agencies are (i) establishment of minimum
educational standards; and (ii) insistence on the maintenance of minimum educational standards for
protection of the public, the institutions and their graduates; (iii) stimulation for continued self-
improvement by the institutions and programs; (iv) protection of institutions from improper external
or internal pressures. W. SELDEN & H. POTTER, ACCREDITATION; ITS PURPOSES AND USES, 7
(1977).
39. Graduation from an ABA approved law school meets the law study requirement of every
state and a number of states limit bar admission to graduates of ABA approved schools. California,
Vermont, Virginia and Washington permit law office study as a substitute for a law school gradua-
tion. Maine, New York and Wyoming permit a combination of law school and law office study as a
substitute for a law school graduation. West Virginia and Wisconsin have a "diploma privilege,"
which permits graduates of one or more law schools located within the state to be admitted without
a written bar examination. A Review of Legal Education in the United States Fall, 1985 Law Schools
and Bar Admissions Requirement 75 (1985).
40. See HARNO, Legal Education in the United States (1953): SULLIVAN, The Professional As-
sociation and Legal Education, 4 J. LEGAL EDUc. 401 (1952).
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ment policy of the school which is intended to prevent the employment of
individuals on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin or sex
though not purporting to do so.4
1
One would be hard pressed to describe this as an affirmative action
statement, policy, or directive. This becomes even clearer when the
above standard is compared with the ABA's standard on the organiza-
tion and administration of law schools, wherein the ABA's position re-
garding the admission of minority students is stated. This standard is as
follows:
Consistent with sound educational policy and the Standards, the law
school shall demonstrate, or have carried out and maintained, by con-
crete action, a commitment to providing full opportunities for the study
of law and entry into the profession by qualified members of groups (no-
tably racial and ethnic minorities) which have been victims of discrimina-
tion in various forms. This commitment would typically include a
special concern for determining the potential of such applicants through
the admissions process, special recruitment efforts, and a program which
assists in meeting the unusual financial needs of many such students.42
Pursuant to this standard the vast majority of law schools accredited and
seeking accreditation from the ABA have established affirmative action
admissions programs.
The ABA has demonstrated an affirmative position in regards to mi-
nority student admission to law schools43 while all but ignoring the im-
portant role of affirmative action for minority professors.' While law
schools and their affiliated universities should be and are primarily re-
sponsible for developing their own affirmative action programs, a sub-
41. A.B.A., 1983 Approval of Law Schools, Standard 211, 5.
42. Id. Standard 212 at 6. This standard was adopted by the Association after the Bakke Case.
It requires that ABA approved schools "demonstrate ... by concrete action, a commitment to
providing full opportunities.... to those who have been victims of discrimination ......
43. It has been argued that the ABA takes such a position in regards to minority admissions
because students have a less protected interest in gaining admission to a law school than employees
have in maintaining employment or gaining a promotion. See, eg., Bartlett v. Pantzer, 158 Mont.
126, 489 P.2d 375 (1971) (although the courts may compel institutions to follow their stated admis-
sions standards after accepting application fees based on the school's publications, they generally will
not require the institution to actually admit an applicant unless the denial of admission is clearly
arbitrary and capricious). Brookins v. Bonnell, 362 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (absent arbitrary
or capricious action, an applicant for admissions has no constitutional due process right to a hearing
to prove his qualifications for admission and no constitutional right to admission). Compare Bishop
v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (a property interest in employment requiring due process notice and
hearing before termination may arise from statute or employment contract).
44. Compare supra notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text. Ethnic diversity in faculty, as well
as student body is educationally sound. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-
315 (1978).
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stantially more definitive standard from the ABA would encourage law
schools to enforce current affirmative action programs as well as formu-
late better policies regarding the continued employment of untenured mi-
nority professors during financially exigent times.
II. DEVELOPING A PROTECTIVE LAYOFF PLAN
The position taken by the ABA with regard to untenured minority
professors in institutions experiencing financial problems is very impor-
tant. However, law schools, and where appropriate their affiliated uni-
versities, should shoulder the ultimate responsibility for instituting a
retrenchment or other policies protective of such groups.
The faculty or appropriate university body is usually primarily respon-
sible for determining faculty status, appointments, reappointments, deni-
als of reappointments, promotions, tenures and dismissals. The faculty's
judgment in these areas is central to general educational policy. Law
faculties also exercise primary responsibility in determining the criteria
for identifying which appointments will be terminated. In determining
where within the academic program termination of appointments will
occur, law faculties should consider affirmative action as well as other
educational policies.
Any policy or guideline developed for the purpose of protecting un-
tenured minority law professors during periods of financial exigency
should be incorporated into affirmative action programs.45 However, the
increase in the number of suits opposing affirmative action generates
mixed signals about what affirmative efforts are required or permissible.46
Any modification of affirmative action programs must be tailored to
withstand legal challenges while still accomplishing their purpose.
45. Some law schools have language in their academic freedom and tenure policy such as, "a
tenured professor will not be terminated in favor of a nontenured faculty member except in ex-
traordinary circumstances where a serious distortion of the academic program might occur." This
language could seemingly protect untenured minority professors. It is more narrowly tailored than
any which might be used for the same purpose in an affirmative action program because it does not
involve the sometimes critically suspect element of race. However, such language can be the subject
of broad interpretations which more likely than not will fail'to protect untenured minority professors
because tenured professors whose jobs are at state will be defining what this language means. Note
also that there is no constitutional requirement that any layoff plan be based on strict seniority. See,
e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v.
Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949). However, the constitution requires that states meet a heavy burden
of justification when it implements a layoff plan based on race. This burden can be met if the plan is
sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet its purpose.
46. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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A. Developing Preferential Policy and The Case Law
If existing affirmative action programs are to be used as a means of
protecting untenured minority professors during periods of financial dis-
tress, what can be done to minimize successful legal challenges? Lower
federal courts have repeatedly upheld voluntary preferential affirmative
action hiring, promotion and layoff plans involving policemen, firemen
and college faculties. Many such decisions have been left standing by the
Supreme Court.47
The first major case dealing with a voluntary affirmative action plan in
the public sector was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.48
A majority of justices (although not producing a majority opinion) held
that a public university's minority admissions quota violated Title VI's
ban on discrimination in federally funded programs. A second majority,
however, agreed that race may be taken into account in the admissions
process. Four justices49 were of the opinion that affirmative action poli-
cies, including quotas, were permissible only if they were adopted to fur-
ther important governmental objectives and were substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.50 Justice Powell's decisive fifth vote ex-
pressed the opinion that admissions policies which furthered diversity in
the student body without rigid quotas were within the First Amendment
rights of universities to adopt and did not violate the constitutional rights*
of applicants from the majority race.5" Bakke offers no clear or definitive
guidelines for resolving issues surrounding voluntary affirmative action
plans in the public sector. Not only is Bakke a case without a majority
opinion, it is also a case in which a majority of justices agreed on certain
results for conflicting reasons.
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts52 is another important
Supreme Court decision in the area of preferential layoff plans. Stotts
began as a class action filed in 1977 by a Black employee of the Memphis,
Tennessee fire department. The complaint alleged a pattern of race dis-
crimination by the fire department and other city officials in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as section 1981 and
section 1983 of the United States Code.
47. See, e-g., Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 938 (1980) (police); Warsocki v. City of Omaha, 726 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1984) (firefight-
ers); Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981) (college
faculty).
48. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
49. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmon.
50. 438 U.S. 357-359.
51. Id. at 311-319.
52. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
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On April 25, 1980 a consent decree for the purpose of remedying the
hiring and promotion practices of the Department with respect to Blacks
was approved and entered by the district court. Pursuant to the decree,
the City of Memphis agreed to adopt a long-term goal of increasing the
proportion of minorities in each job classification in the fire department
to approximately the proportion of Blacks in the labor force in Shelby
County, Tennessee.
In 1981 the City announced it would reduce the fire department's
work force. Layoffs would be based on a last hired, first fired seniority
system which had been part of a memorandum of understanding with the
union. Black firefighters contested the plan because it would have nulli-
fied the effect of the favorable hiring and promotion actions they were
experiencing pursuant to the consent decree.
The district court found that the layoff plan was not adopted with a
discriminatory intent. The court, however, concluded that the plan
would'have an adverse impact on black firemen and was not bona fide
under section 703(h) of Title VII.53 The court then issued a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the City from applying the plan insofar as it would
decrease the percentage of Blacks in certain positions within the depart-
ment. To comply with the order the City adopted amodified plan termi-
nating some Whites with more seniority than Blacks who were retained.
The firefighters union and the City appealed. The Sixth Circuit re-
jected the district court's conclusion that the regular seniority system
was not bona fide. Nevertheless, it affirmed the district court's order be-
cause the order was intended to enforce the consent decree.
The substantive issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Stotts was
whether the district court exceeded its authority when it modified the
consent decree. The Court did not focus on race-conscious hiring but
rather on the race-conscious protection (in a period of retrenchment) of
the minority hiring gains that had resulted from the 1980 consent decree.
The Supreme Court held that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 the district court exceeded its statutory power when it ordered an
affirmative action layoff plan protective of newly hired Blacks in contra-
vention of a bona fide seniority plan protected under section 703(h) of
Title VII.
While Stotts has been heralded by critics of affirmative action, the deci-
53. Section 703(h) provides: it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system... provided that such differences are not the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, national origins. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h).
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sion should be read narrowly. 4 The Stotts decision limits the power of
federal courts to modify a consent decree over the objection of one of the
parties to the decree.5 Neither can courts ignore the protection section
703(h) of Title VII accords to a bona fide seniority system. Stotts cannot
be read to limit the Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers v.
Weber 6 which upheld a voluntary private sector affirmative action pro-
gram with racial quotas against a Title VII challenge. Neither did it
address the lawfulness of voluntary preferential affirmative action plans
in the public sector. The question of whether a public employer could
have voluntarily adopted the kind of layoff policy ordered by the district
court was expressly reserved by the Court.
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,58 the Supreme Court specifi-
cally addressed the question of whether a public employer could extend
preferential protection against layoff to some of its employees based on
race or national origins. In 1972 the Jackson Board of Education
(Board) and Jackson Education Association (Union) added a layoff pro-
vision to their collective bargaining agreement which stated:
In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers
through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most
seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current
percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff. In
no event will the number given notice of possible layoff be greater than
the number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher so affected will be
called back in reverse order for positions for which he is certificated
maintaining the above minority balance.59
During 1976-77 and 1981-82 school years, non-minority teachers were
laid off while minority teachers with less seniority were retained. The
dismissed non-minority teachers brought this suit in federal district court
charging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and other federal and state statutes.
On motion for summary judgment the district court dismissed all but
54. Justice Steven's concurring opinion stated that "the Court's discussion of Title VII is
wholly advisory. These cases involve no issue under Title VII; they involve only the administration
of a consent decree." 467 U.S. at 590.
55. Federal courts may, however, enter consent decrees that provide broader relief than the
court could have awarded after trial without the consent of one of the parties. There is no conflict
with or violation of section 706(g) of Title VII when a federal court enters such a consent decree.
Local Number 93 Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 54 U.S.L.W. at 5005 (1986).
56. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
57. 467 U.S. at 583.
58. 476 U.S. at 267.
59. Id. at 270-271.
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the equal protection claims. The district court, addressing the equal pro-
tection charge, found that the racial preferences granted to minorities
need not be grounded in a finding of "plain discrimination" and upheld
the constitutionality of the layoff provision. The petitioners appealed and
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district courts' decision.
On review the Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the layoff plan
was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Court, however, specifically recognized the
constitutionality of voluntary preferential affirmative action programs in
public employment.60 There also seemed to be agreement that race may
be affirmatively taken into account in employment plans even if there has
been no finding of past discrimination. 6'
Wygant suggests that any affirmative action plan must be justified by a
compelling state purpose and the means chosen by the public employer
to carry out the purpose must be narrowly tailored.62 The phrase "nar-
rowly tailored" requires consideration of whether lawful alternatives and
less restrictive means could have been used.63 The layoff plan need not
be limited to remedying specific instances of identified discrimination for
it to be sufficiently narrowly tailored. 41 Wygant indicates that a preferen-
tial layoff plan will be more defensible if it is grounded in a policy that
acknowledges discrimination and the institution's responsibility for or in-
terest in correcting the results.
Courts have also scrutinized the suitability of the affirmative remedy
involved to the discrimination found. This reasoning implies that a vari-
ety of criteria must be considered in formulating a defensible layoff plan
which will provide more job security to untenured minority professors.
The plan should identify and, as far as possible, document specific
problems of underrepresentation and the specific policies and practices
involved in perpetuating them. In addition, the means employed in the
plan should be narrowly and specifically tailored to the specific problems
of untenured minority professors.
Affirmative action programs are regarded as temporary measures.65
Courts generally look for indications of when they will end. Conse-
60. Id. at 287.
61. Id. at 289.
62. Id. at 267.
63. Id. at 280.
64. Justice O'Connor noted in her opinion, "the court has forged a degree of unanimity; it is
agreed that a plan need not be limited to the remedying of specific instances of identified discrimina-
tion for it to be deemed sufficiently 'narrowly tailored,' or 'substantially related,' to the correction of
prior discrimination by the state actor." Id. at 287.
65. Id. at 275.
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quently, this would seem to require that a racially based layoff plan in-
clude clearly articulated measurable goals which imply an end point
and/or a basis for reasonably estimating how long such remedies will be
in force.
In Wygant the Supreme Court refused to determine whether the par-
ticular layoff plan at issue would have been sufficiently narrowly tailored
without reference to the hiring goal it was intended to further. 66 In addi-
tion, the Court expressly reserved the question of whether any preferen-
tial layoff plan could withstand strict Scrutiny. Wygant, while not
prescriptive, seems to suggest some very general and useful guidelines for
a more defensible layoff plan. Institutions considering such plans, how-
ever, need not have engaged in past discrimination.67
III. CONCLUSION
Affirmative action is an important element of a sound educational pol-
icy. Assuring that minority professors will remain a viable part of legal
education is an essential part of this recognition.
Institutions that have not provided for financial exigency need hasten
to do so because there is a natural tendency for those who feel threatened
by affirmative action to view it less harshly in good times than in bad.
Futhermore, the exact mechanism used to implement preferential layoff
plans will depend on considerations and objectives which will require
much time, effort, and thought.
As with affirmative action in general, the mood of the law faculty and
how it interprets its duty are important factors in determining how well
the plan is formulated in theory and how well it works in reality. How-
ever, by enshrining preferential layoff plans in affirmative action pro-
grams, untenured minority professors are given a legal recourse they
would not otherwise have.
The role of the ABA is equally important in this regard. If minority
professors are to remain in legal education, the ABA must take a more
active role regarding minority employment and announce a more defini-
tive and affirmative position. The policy adopted by the ABA is espe-
cially important since it is the only collective enterprise that seriously
attempts to regulate law schools.
The Supreme Court decisions in this area must be given the strictest
possible adherence. The cases, while not offering definite rules for formu-
66. Id. at 294.
67. Id. at 286, 290. See also Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(1I)
(1984) ("Even in the absence of such prior discrimination, a recipient [of federal financial assistance]
in administering a program may take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions which
resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular race, color, or national origin.")
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lating racially based plans, do provide some general guidance. The key
to formulating a preferential layoff plan which will withstand legal chal-
lenges seems to revolve around the issue of its being sufficiently narrowly
tailored. In this regard a wise starting point would be to set out the
purpose of such plans as "assuring the presence of minority professors in
the academic program." No distinction need be drawn between (tenured
or untenured) minority professors. Nonusage of the terms tenure and
untenured is important because it demonstrates an interest in assuring
the presence of minority professors in legal teaching. By not drawing
distinctions between classes of minority professors, the plan is arguably
sufficiently tailored to protect minority professors in general without cre-
ating a fear in tenured professors that a special class of minority profes-
sors is being promoted. Furthermore, there is no logical need to draw a
distinction between minority professors since only a very small number
are in fact tenured.
The potential effect of financial exigency on minority professors is fur-
ther demonstrated when several other factors are considered in conjunc-
tion with the minority employment practices of many law schools. For
instance, the number of minority professors, especially Blacks, is pres-
ently in a state of decline. Perhaps the most startling fact of all is that
minorities find it as difficult to obtain employment in law teaching at
predominantly white schools today as it was in the 60's.
These facts should also illustrate the importance of retaining minority
professors already within the system. Many law schools, especially in the
South, are already experiencing the effects of declining enrollments and
budget cuts. Since it is very unlikely that funds will be available to hire
new faculty members or that anyone would join the faculty of a law
school that is experiencing financial difficulties given humanistic con-
cerns for employment security, it is reasonable to conclude that minority
professors already teaching should be retained at other costs.
